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ABSTRACT
This paper draws from resources in the work of Deleuze to critically
examine the notion of organicism and holistic relations that appear
in historical forerunners that Jung identiﬁes in his work on
synchronicity. I interpret evidence in Jung’s comments on
synchronicity that resonate with Deleuze’s interpretation of
repetition and time and which challenge any straightforward
foundationalist critique of Jung’s thought. A contention of the
paper is that Jung and Deleuze envisage enchanted openings
onto relations which are not constrained by the presupposition of
a bounded whole, whether at the level of the macrocosm or the
microcosm. Openings to these relations entail the potential for
experimental transformation beyond sedentary habits of thought
which are blocked by a disenchanting ‘image of thought’ that
stands in need of critique. Other examples of enchanted openings
in Jung’s work are signposted in an eﬀort to counter their
marginalisation in some post-Jungian critiques and to signal their
potential value from a Deleuzian perspective.
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Introduction
In the preface to Gilles Deleuze’s (1925–1995) most well-known work Diﬀerence and Rep-
etition (1968) and in the opening of his and Félix Guattari’s (1930–1992) last major publi-
cation What is Philosophy (1991), the question ‘what are we doing in philosophy today’ is
broadly repeated (1968/1994, p. xxi; 1991/1994). Elsewhere Deleuze writes: ‘[w]e’re looking
for ‘vitality.’ Even psychoanalysis needs to address a certain ‘vitality’ in the patient, which
the patient has lost, but which the analyst has lost, too’ (2003, p. 142). This ‘vitality’ refers to
a pre-individual, impersonal world of relations, relations which are often hidden and con-
cealed under identities such as subject and object in the actual world.1
The contention of this paper is that there are openings in C.G. Jung’s (1875–1961)
thought to relations of this vital kind which can be critically examined using tools from
the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari. To begin this examination, the example I use in
the main section of the paper is extracted from comments by Jung in which he refers
to the nature of synchronistic relations as ‘transversal’. I consider how this might be inter-
preted from a Deleuzian perspective. I contrast this with historical examples used by Jung
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in his ‘Forerunners of the Idea of Synchronicity’ exposition from Synchronicity: An Acausal
Connecting Principle (1952, pars. 916–946) in order to demonstrate that a Deleuzian
interpretation of synchronistic relations as ‘transversal’ faces challenges from a historical
tradition of correspondence, sympathy and harmony. This tradition constrains relations
within foundational concepts of the ‘whole’. When these relations are constrained, an
undesirable set of logical and ethical implications might be implicitly grounded. In the
second section of the paper I try to attenuate these undesirable implications by focusing
on Jung’s use of the term ‘multiplicity’ from the monograph (1952, para. 828) and how this
resonates with a Deleuzian interpretation of time.
Although it was impossible for Jung to have become acquainted with the thought of
Deleuze, Deleuze was inﬂuenced by Jung and profoundly so. Evidence of this inﬂuence
appears in almost all of Deleuze’s major publications from the 1960s, including his colla-
borative eﬀorts with French psychiatrist Guattari in the 1970s and 1980s. Erudite second-
ary studies by Christian Kerslake (2004, 2007) also attest to this inﬂuence, extending as it
does through the vitalist philosophy of Henri Bergson (1859–1941). Deleuze’s frequent
appeals to Jung’s psychology should not be read as an attempt on his part to address
insuﬃciencies in his own thought. As he and Guattari did with so many ‘non-philosophies’
(scientiﬁc, artistic, psychoanalytic), they built an assemblage across their philosophy and
other domains of thought in order to ﬁnd a new ‘vitality’ for philosophy. Deleuze was
an anti-foundational thinker, but he also refers to himself as a ‘vitalist’,2 and a ‘metaphy-
sician’, highly critical of most branches of phenomenology which had emerged before
and during his life-time. In the concluding section of the paper I refer to concepts and
openings other than synchronicity in Jung’s thought which could be exploited from a
Deleuzian perspective. This potentially challenges some of the post-Jungian, phenomen-
ological, anti-foundationalist critiques which appear to have marginalised these concepts
in order to resolve an apparent insuﬃciency in Jung’s thought.
There has been little scholarship on the Jung-Deleuze relationship from the perspec-
tives of clinicians and academics in Jungian Studies. One of my broader goals with this
contribution is to establish a space for reﬂection on this relationship, to stimulate positive
critical comment, and to aﬃrm the continuing relevance that Jung and Jungian thought
has beyond the domain of Analytical Psychology.
Jung, deleuze and organicism: enchantment, sympathy and ‘Other’
repetitions
Small things, which were formerly just banal and self-evident, should now have a real value;
they should mean something and have a life of their own. For then one can take care of things
properly – value things. One becomes considerate, and if it is a deep realisation, one begins to
pay attention to the things that simply happen. One never says, ‘this is nothing’, but one says,
‘this is’. And then one understands what the transversal connection, the synchronistic connec-
tion, really is. (Jung, 1930–4, para. 340)
The ‘transversal connection’ and the ‘value’ of things that is revealed by ‘deep-realisation’
and ‘attention’ can be understood as a kind of repetition, one which bestows value
because of the enchanting effect that emerges as something from the macrocosm is
repeated in the microcosm. What is it that might be ‘enchanting’ about the experience
of a ‘deep realisation’ of this kind? In answering this question I deploy an understanding
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of enchantment articulated by Jane Bennett: ‘Enchantment as a mood requires a culti-
vated form of perception, a discerning and meticulous attentiveness to the singular speci-
ﬁcity of things’ (2001, p. 37; italics added). Attentiveness can be glossed as a form of
intuition and for Deleuze it would be Bergson’s ‘method’ of intuition3 that would serve
a possible model albeit with signiﬁcant modiﬁcations incorporated from his reading of
Marcel Proust’s (1913–1922) In Search of Lost Time (1913). There is something anti-meth-
odological in this intuition because it is involuntary and Deleuze refers to this as a ‘funda-
mental encounter’: ‘What is encountered may be Socrates, a temple or a demon. It may be
grasped in a range of affective tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In whichever tone, its
primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed’ (1968/1994, p. 139). The object that pre-
cipitates such an encounter is not the most important element; rather it is its ‘sense’ that
forces us to think (cf. Bennett, 2001, p. 53). When sense and its relations are opened up in
an encounter and no longer subordinated to a ‘subject’, possibilities for transformation
emerge because the habitual and superﬁcial self is confronted with its own dissolution.
This is one of the reasons why so much of Deleuze’s philosophy is engaged with the
‘sense’ that he found liberated in experimental works of art, for example in the ﬁgures
of Francis Bacon (1909–1992), and the literary productions of James Joyce (1882–1941).4
In his ‘Forerunners’ section from Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle (1952)
Jung refers to a line of Neo-platonic, hermetic and Renaissance thinkers from whom
examples of this mode of repetition may be discerned: Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499), Pico
della Mirandola (1463–1494), Agrippa von Nettesheim (1486–1535), and Paracelsus
(1493–1541). He quotes Aggripa: ‘Thus the Elements are not only in these inferior
bodies [corporeal world], but also in the Heavens, in Stars, in Divels, in Angels, and
lastly in God, the maker and archetype of all things’ (para. 930). Historically, explanations
of this enchanting mode of repetition have often taken the form of metaphysical specu-
lations concerning a holistic and teleological structure of the universe (Bennett, 2001,
p. 38). Jung exclaims that ‘[s]ynchronicity is a modern diﬀerentiation of the obsolete
concept of correspondence [Correspondentia], sympathy, and harmony’ (ibid., para. 995).
Deleuze takes a keen interest in common Neo-Platonic and hermetic themes such as
the ‘One’, ‘whole’, ‘unity’ and ‘totality’, themes which resonate closely with the classical
notion of sympathy and an organicist conception of the macrocosm as an ‘organism’
(see Ramey, 2012).5 Nevertheless, he rejects a holistic mode of repetition, one associated
with the classical holistic notion of sympathy. Deleuze is a thinker of enchantment, one
invested in enchanted ‘encounters’, kinds of repetition in which ‘something in the
world forces us to think’ (1968/1994, p. 176).6 Furthermore, I consider Deleuze to be a ‘hol-
istic’ thinker but one invested in a model of holistic relations that remains resolutely
opposed to macrocosmic and microcosmic models of holistic organicism
Borrowing again from Jung’s ‘Forerunners’ exposition, we ﬁnd a paradigmatic example
of a classical holistic organicism drawn from the Greek physician Hippocrates (460–370bc):
There is one common ﬂow, one common breathing, all things are in sympathy. The whole
organism and each one of its parts are working in conjunction for the same purpose and
each of its parts are working in conjunction for the same purpose… the principle extends
to the extremist part, and from the extremist part it returns to the great principle, to the
one nature, being and not-being. (1952, para. 924)
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In the following passage from Proust and Signs 1964/2000), we discern Deleuze’s aware-
ness of the same tradition of holistic organicism. In the same passage he hints at another
mode (or ‘fashion’) of repetition:
When a part is valid for itself, when a fragment speaks in itself, when a sign appears, it may be
in two very diﬀerent fashions: either because it permits us to divine the whole from which it is
taken, to reconstitute the organism or the statue to which it belongs, and to seek out the other
part that belongs to it… The ﬁrst fashion is that of the Greeks; it is only in this form that they
tolerate “aphorisms.” The smallest part must still be amicrocosm for them to recognise in it an
adherence to the greater whole of a macrocosm. The signs are composed according to analo-
gies and articulations that form a great Organism, as we still ﬁnd it in the Platonism of the
Middle Ages and the Renaissance. They are caught up in an order of the world, a network
of signiﬁcant contents and ideal signiﬁcations that still testify to a Logos (1964/2000, p. 113)
Deleuze refers to the kind of repetition that he found problematic as a ‘brute’ or ‘bare’
repetition. What he means by this is a repetition of the same (1968/1994, p. 128). When he
suggests that something in the world forces us to think, this ‘something’ is neither an
empirical object of recognition, nor a former present in time, nor a mythical present,
nor an orginary term. Likewise, time is not the mere measure of movement, a ‘periodic
or circular time which is that of Physis and is subordinate to the events which occur
within it’ (1968/1994, p. 110). Borrowing from Hamlet, Deleuze seeks to aﬃrm an alterna-
tive time, a ‘time out of joint’, ‘time outside the curve which gave it a god, liberated from its
overly simple circular ﬁgure, freed from the events which made up its [mimetic] content,
its relation to movement overturned; in short, time presenting itself as an empty and pure
form’ (1968/1994).
If we situate the ‘brute’, ‘bare’ repetition and ‘circular’ ﬁgure of time in relation to the
examples of classical organicism described earlier then what is challenged is the presumed
relation between part and whole, a rejection of the view that ‘an enchanting phenomenon
be understood as part of a divine creation or as a particular instance of a universal will’
(Bennett, 2001, p. 40). The image of a non-teleological enchantment can often be found
in Deleuze’s criticisms of ‘organic totality in which each part pre-determines the whole
and in which the whole determines the part’ (1964/2000, p. 113). Likewise his criticisms
of a dialectic of evolution and lingering belief in ‘the myth of existence of fragments
that, like pieces of an antique statue, are merely waiting for the last one to be turned
up, so that they may all be glued back together to create a unity that is precisely the
same as the original unity’ (1972/1983, p. 42) seem to aﬃrm a narrative of disenchantment.
Deleuze critically interrogates repetition along with diﬀerence in his seminal work
Diﬀerence and Repetition. The main target of this text is what Deleuze calls the ‘traditional
image of thought’:
By this I mean not only that we think according to a given method, but also that there is a
more or less implicit, tacit or presupposed image of thought which determines our goals
when we try to think. For example we suppose that thought possesses a good nature, and
the thinker a good will (naturally to ‘want’ the true); we take as a model the process of
recognition – in other words, a common sense or employment of all the faculties on the sup-
posed same object; we designate error, nothing by error, as the enemy to be fought; and we
suppose that the true concerns solutions – in other words propositions capable of serving as
answers. (1968/1994, p. xvi).
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This ‘model’ of thought renders us incapable of thinking ‘difference in itself’ (1968/1994,
xiv) because it subordinates difference to representation, the four criteria of which are
identity, resemblance, opposition and analogy. Under this model repetition, as the re-
presentation of that which is to be recognised as the same, fares little better. Deleuze
states that ‘repetition is not generality’ (1968/1994, p. 1) and of the reasons he offers for
this it is the following that concerns us here. Generality implies an exchange or substi-
tution of particulars based on resemblance and equivalence. From the perspective of gen-
erality, repetition is the re-presentation of a universal in a particular, referring to the
equivalence of successive individuations of an original identity. ‘Generality, as generality
of the particular, stands opposed to repetition as universality of the singular’ (1968/
1994, pp. 1–2).
Arguably the genesis of Deleuze’s interest in the whole cannot be divorced from the
eﬀects that he and others endured under the extremes of political totalitarianism in
France during the Second World War. Post-war continental philosophy is marked by the
crises of this war and the shadows cast by the names of Auschwitz and Hiroshima. If
Western philosophy has traditionally been associated with the promotion of images of
reason then during the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century the systems of judgement
that philosophy and its images employed are found wanting. Gregg Lambert claims
that the ‘event of crisis could also signal for us that point where contemporary philosophy
folds back and takes itself as an object of the most radical operations’ (2003, p. 15).
Deleuze’s philosophy and that of his compatriots Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995) and
Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) are exemplary of this moment of auto-critique. Deleuze
refers to the ‘image of reason’ as ‘the image of thought,’ (see above) and he takes ques-
tions of ‘diﬀerence’, ‘identity’ and ‘representation’ to be singularly important in the ﬁght
against this one-sided Western ‘image’; an image that has occluded the singular, and
obscured and concealed relations and their geneses within a mode of repetition which
subsumes particulars under a universal. In another way, Deleuze’s criticism of the
‘image of thought’ can be read as a disenchantment narrative, for which, however, his
practical philosophy paradoxically oﬀers some means of resistance by opening up
spaces for enchanted encounters. What is unusual about Deleuze’s philosophy is the
extent to which he engages with other ‘non-philosophies’ (Lambert, 2003) such as
science, modern art (e.g. Bacon), literature (e.g. Proust, Joyce, Kafka, Beckett), and
modern cinema in his attempts to construct a ‘thought without image, even at the cost
of the greatest destructions and the greatest demoralisations’ (1968/1994, p. 132).
When philosophy works with these other non-philosophies, together they become a
‘machinic assemblage’,7 capable of producing concepts. This process of production is
both critical and creative. It is critical of images of thought which take representation, iden-
tity and recognition to be metaphysically foundational. In other words it is critical of
images such as the Cartesian Cogito and the Kantian transcendental subject whose func-
tion is to ensure that possible experience is immanent to the subject, a subject which
stands external and over against a world of objects. This has a disenchanting eﬀect
because it conceals the genesis of relations and their syntheses within an image which,
says Deleuze, is ‘traced from the empirical ﬁgures which it makes possible’ (1968/1994,
p. 151). The creative process involves non-philosophies in an eﬀort to reveal relations
and their syntheses when they are liberated from an external, synthesising power. An
enchanted ‘encounter’ is an example of this liberation, an opening, one which often
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takes place ‘under the impulse of a shock [rather] than in the excitement of a taste for
thinking’ (Deleuze, 1968/1994, p. 132). We need to bear in mind that these encounters
do not reveal something which is retrospectively determined as having been lost,
thereby gesturing to the restoration of a ‘natural’ way of relating. Rather ‘enchantment’
concerns a rich source of possibilities and openings for experimental transformations,
beyond the subject and beyond the ‘human’.
If, as I have claimed, Deleuze is a thinker of enchantment then what alternatives does he
propose to the ‘brute’ and ‘bare’model of repetition that he associates with organicism; an
organcism that Jung appears to have tacitly endorsed given his selections in the ‘Forerun-
ners’ exposition. In order to answer this, I return to Jung’s ﬁnal sentence from the opening
passage: ‘And then one understands what the transversal connection, the synchronistic
connection, really is.’ Although it is not possible to get a precise purchase on the term
‘transversal’ as it appears in the work of Deleuze and Guattari, what they mean by it is a
kind of communication. In the following passage they refer to this kind of communication
in terms of relations:
Between things does not designate a localisable relation going from one thing to the other and
back again, but a perpendicular direction, a transversal movement that sweeps one and the
other away, a stream without beginning or end that undermines its banks and picks up
speed in the middle. (1980/1987, p. 25; italics original)
A kind of sympathy can be discerned in the way in which Deleuze characterises trans-
versal communication and transversal relations as occurring ‘between’ and without begin-
ning or end. Indeed, he and Guattari use the term ‘plateau’ in the title of their 1980 work A
Thousand Plateaus (1980) ‘to designate something very special: a continuous, self-vibrating
region of intensities whose development avoids any orientation toward a culmination
point or external end’ (1980/1987, p. 1–2). They explicitly acknowledge the holistic
thinker Gregory Bateson (1904–1980)8 as their source for this term adding that ‘[i]t is a
regrettable characteristic of the Western mind to relate expressions and actions to exterior
or transcendent ends, instead of evaluating them on a plane of consistency on the basis of
their intrinsic value’ (1968/1994, p. 2). Deleuze employs the term ‘multiplicity’ to express
his contention that ‘what counts are not the terms or the elements, but what there is
‘between,’ – the between are a set of relations that are inseparable from each other.
Every multiplicity grows from the middle, like the blade of grass or the rhizome’
(Deleuze and Parnet, 1977/1987, p. viii). Plateau, multiplicity, becoming, rhizome and
assemblage, are just some of the terms that Deleuze and Guattari will use to convey
the priority of the ‘between’ that characterises transversal relations. They use these con-
cepts creatively, to force their readers to think critically about relations whilst providing
in each ‘plateau’ (of their A Thousand Plateaus) examples of ‘unnatural participations or
nuptials [which] are the true Nature spanning the kingdoms of nature (1987, p. 241),
the products of transversal communication: ‘becoming-animal, ‘becoming-whale’, becom-
ing-dog, becoming-woman’, ‘becoming-molecular’, ‘becoming-child’ etc.9
The ‘between’ of transversal relations can be read as one of Deleuze’s critical responses
to systems and models of the whole which implicitly or explicitly privilege relations of
interiority. Relations of this kind are evident in the mode of repetition characteristic of hol-
istic organicism, i.e. a ‘brute’ or ‘bare repetition’ in which relations are determined in
advance or ‘given’ because the ‘whole’ is given. In other words the whole is ‘closed’. In
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Bergsonism (1966), Deleuze claims that we should ‘be delighted that the Whole is not
given’ (1966/1991, p. 104) and that we deceive ourselves in thinking that the whole is
‘given’ when we confuse space and time by assimilating the latter into the former. He
goes to say that, ‘[o]n the one hand, it is right to compare the living being to the whole
of the universe, but it is wrong to interpret this comparison as if it expressed two
closed totalities (macrocosm and microcosm)’ (1968/1994, p. 105). His concern is that if
we prioritise relations of interiority and assume a whole to be closed, then relations are
subordinated and any dynamic potential to connect, morph and ‘become’ in new exper-
imental ways might be compromised.
Relations of exteriority – transversal relations – involve a mode of repetition that
Deleuze refers to as an ‘‘other’ repetition’ (1968/1994, p. 25). He says that a ‘bare, material
repetition (repetition of the Same) appears only in the sense that another repetition is dis-
guised within it, constituting it and constituting itself in disguising itself’ (1968/1994, p. 21;
italics added). This ‘other’ repetition ‘forms the essence of that in which every repetition
consists: diﬀerence without a concept, non-mediated diﬀerence’ (1968/1994, p. 25). Situ-
ating this in the context of ‘enchantment’, Bennett refers to this ‘other’ repetition as a
‘spiral repetition’ in which ‘things repeat but with a twist. And this twist – or to use the
Lucretian term, swerve – makes possible new formations’ (2001, p. 39). Where earlier I
spoke of ‘unnatural participations’ and ‘becomings’, in ‘spiral’ repetition ‘each turn of
the spiral enters into a new and distinctive assemblage – with absolutely local chirps,
odours, herbs, thoughts, whris images, breezes, light waves, viruses, animals, machines,
and minerals in its milieu’ (1968/1994, p. 40).
What is not contended in this paper is that Jung’s singular use of the term ‘transversal’
(which occurs in the same sentence as ‘synchronistic connection’) maps perfectly onto the
way in which the term ‘transversal’ was used by Deleuze and Guattari as a shorthand for
relations of exteriority. To the contrary, the examples he employs in his ‘Forerunners’
section seem to suggest that Jung tacitly aﬃrmed relations of interiority and a version
of holistic organicism in his ‘modern diﬀerentiation’ (1952, para. 995) of the classical
notion of sympathy. By paying attention to some of the more recent ﬁgures that Jung
includes in his list of ‘Forerunners’, e.g. Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646–1716) and
the late nineteenth century embryologist and neo-vitalist Hans Driesch (1867–1941), the
same form of organicism, sympathy and internal relations can be identiﬁed. I will
pursue some of these identiﬁcations in the following section, deploying critical responses
from both Deleuze and Jung to Leibniz’s notion of a ‘pre-established harmony’. These
responses indicate that it would be irresponsible to conclude that Jung’s account of the
‘whole’ is isomorphic with the form of organicism deployed in the accounts from the
‘Forerunners’
Time in crisis: time ‘out of joint’: time and multiplicity
I have used examples from Jung’s ‘Forerunners’ exposition selectively, and for the pur-
poses of illustrating some of the potential diﬀerences between a Deleuzian account of
sympathy and enchantment, and Jung’s account. It may be the case that the ‘transversal
connection, the synchronistic connection, really is’ similar to an ‘other’ repetition with
‘spiral’ dynamics. If this were so an explanation of a ‘transversal’, ‘synchronistic connection’
might be complemented by a Deleuzian account of enchanted repetition.
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At the same time this might depend on how strongly we take Jung’s claim that synchro-
nicity is ‘not based on philosophical assumptions but on empirical experience’ (1952, para.
995). Earlier I mentioned Deleuze’s interest in what he called a ‘fundamental encounter’
and how this prompted an intuitive engagement with ‘sense’ via enchanted, ‘other’ rep-
etition. Is there something similar in this encounter and the kind of ‘empirical experience’
that Jung classes as a synchronistic? The ‘empirical’ material of synchronistic experiences
bear little resemblance to the ‘empirical’ of sensible givens received in passive intuition
that would have occupied ‘empiricists’ such as John Locke (1632–1704) and David
Hume (1711–1776). It is also nothing like the object-recognition of possible experience
for which Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) transcendentally deduced the a priori intuitions
(space and time) and categories of the Understanding as necessary conditions (conditions
which remain external to that which they condition). There is something special about syn-
chronistic experiences to the extent that they cannot be traced from what ordinarily
passes for the empirical. On the basis of these special experiences we cannot determine
the ground of experience as a ‘subject’. Indeed, these experiences can be read as challen-
ging such a philosophical assumption, potentially turning synchronicity into a mode of
critique.
In order to unpack this further I return to Deleuze’s phrase from Hamlet that ‘time is out
of joint’. He also recounts this phrase in the preface to the English edition of Cinema 2: The
Time-Image:
Over several centuries, from the Greeks to Kant, a revolution took place in philosophy: the sub-
ordination of time to movement was reversed, time ceases to be the measurement of normal
movement, it increasingly appears for itself and creates paradoxical movements. Time is out of
joint: Hamlet’s words signify that time is no longer subordinated to movement, but rather
movement to time. (1985/1989, p. xi)
An ‘image’ of time is being challenged according to Deleuze. In Western philosophy the
historical moment when this challenge occurs begins with Kant’s critical philosophy.
Deleuze takes inspiration from the Kantian notion of time as a pure and empty form, a
form of interiority. Deleuze writes that ‘we should be concerned with a precise moment
within Kantianism, a furtive and explosive moment which is not even continued by
Kant much less by post-Kantianism’ (1968/1994, p. 58). Deleuze uses the formula ‘time
is out of joint’ to summarise this challenge but he also uses the phrase ‘I is an Other’
(1968/1994, p. 86). In questioning the relationship between time and movement, he is
questioning what he considers to be an historical account of the relationship between
time, movement and repetition that had been assumed to determine the ground of sub-
jectivity. Deleuze exploits a ‘moment’ in Kant’s thought in order to demonstrate that some-
thing fundamental changes. ‘[T]he cosmological harmony between the world and the
heavens, man and the heavenly Gods, has somehow broken down’ (Voss, 2013, p. 125).
How? Kant no longer deﬁnes time as a cosmological or psychological time. In the
‘Paradox of Inner Sense’ from his ﬁrst Critique (1781) he claims that I must experience
everything passively under the form of time as the form of interiority. Hence my empirical
self is known only as an object of thought, as it appears to itself as a representation. This
precludes me from encountering the transcendental subject – an Other – whose sponta-
neity cannot be appropriated. The important point to note is that my empirical self only
has an identity under the form of time. Its identity is no longer guaranteed by something
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that subordinates time to the measure of something other than itself or to something
outside it.
In synchronistic experiences, the conclusion can be drawn that a ‘normal’ image of time
is placed in crisis. Roderick Main writes that ‘[s]ynchronicity ﬂagrantly transgresses the
normal ways in which time is understood to operate’ and that ‘in synchronicity, uniformly
unfolding clock time is interrupted with moments of extraordinary timeliness, which in
turn can open our eyes to a sense of present time as qualitative, ﬁlled with varying land-
scapes of meaning’ (2004, pp. 182–183). Is there a link between a ‘time out of joint’ and the
time of synchronicity that tells us something about the (passive) genesis of the subject?
This is not an easy question to answer. Nonetheless I think the possibility is left open by
Jung in the conclusion to Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle when he takes
issue with thinkers such as Leibniz for postulating, ‘an act of God, of some principle stand-
ing outside empirical nature’ (1952, para. 948; italics added) that would be necessary for
the coordination of soul and body. He continues that ‘[i]t is not necessary to think of Leib-
niz’s pre-established harmony or anything of that kind, which would be absolute and
would manifest itself in a universal correspondence and sympathy’ (1952). What I ﬁnd
of value in this passage is Jung’s apparent rejection of an external form of conditioning,
a guarantor, presupposed as necessary for ensuring the analytic identity of the subject.
Earlier in the monograph, where Jung turns his attention to the thought of Schopenhauer
(1788–1860), we ﬁnd additional evidence which reinforces the rejection of an external
‘principle’:
Schopenhauer believed in the absolute determinism of the natural process and furthermore in
a ﬁrst cause. There is nothing to warrant either assumption. The ﬁrst cause is a philosophical
mythologem which is only credible when it appears in the form of the old paradox… as unity
and multiplicity all at once. (ibid., para. 828)
Here the external principle is associated with a ﬁrst cause as unity. Interestingly Jung
almost immediately follows this passage by suggesting that ifmultiplicity were exchanged
for unity, ‘which is just as likely then Schopenhauer’s whole explanation collapses, quite
apart from the fact… that natural law possesses a merely statistical validity and thus
keeps the door open to indeterminism’ (ibid.). Whether the ‘paradox’ Jung refers to as
unity =multiplicity can be equated with Deleuze and Guattari’s desire to ‘[a]rrive at the
magic formula we all seek – pluralism =monism – via all the dualisms that are the
enemy’ (1980/1987, pp. 20–21) will have to be explored at another time. The potential con-
nection between Jung and Deleuze that interests me now is time as ‘multiplicity’ and ‘time
out of joint’.
Keeping in mind Jung’s critical comments on Leibniz and the harmonia praestabilita,
the ‘image’ of time that Leibniz erects reveals the character of a ‘teleologist on the defen-
sive’ (Bennett, 2001, p. 69). Leibniz was trying to resolve a crisis of time, a crisis engendered
by disenchantment, but his solution was classical. The classical function of God (Scientia
Dei) is retained by Leibniz and, thus, he ‘spatialised time from the point where God
could see the whole of time stretched out across divergent (incompossible) universes in
order to choose the world that was the ‘most ripe’ with possibilities’ (Lambert, 2003,
p. 13). This idea of the spatialisation of time is important because it helps to unpack
what Deleuze means by ‘time out of joint’. In Bergsonism he writes that:
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The confusion of space and time, the assimilation of time into space, make us think that the
whole is given, even if only in principle, even if only in the eyes of God. And this is the mistake
that is common to mechanism and ﬁnalism [teleology]. The former assumes that everything is
determinable in terms of a state; the latter, that everything is determinable in terms of a pro-
gramme: In any event time is only there now as a screen that hides the eternal from us, or that
shows successively what a God or superhuman intelligence would see in a single glance.
(1966/1991, p. 104)
Jung’s rejection of the ‘external principle’ entails a rejection of what is referred to
above as a ‘spatialised time’. It entails a rejection of a power of judgement that is
bestowed upon something ‘outside’ time, e.g. the judgement of God10, whose character
is believed to be ‘ethical’, a power to choose the best of all possible worlds. What is
repeated is this choice, ﬁnding its principle in what Leibniz refers to as ‘compossibility’.
I am arguing that Jung rejects this kind of ‘judgement of God’. Thus he rejects the theo-
logical hypothesis of a selecting God (cf. Kerslake, 2007, pp. 152–154). ‘Multiplicity’
entails the ‘death’ of this kind of God and the form of a spatialised time. If time as ‘mul-
tiplicity’ is not governed by something external to it, then it unfolds or unrolls to
become a pure straight line, no longer subordinated, as in ancient cosmology, to the
measurement of the circular movements of the planets or more generally to the move-
ment of physical bodies in space. The identity of the subject guaranteed within this cos-
mological order begins to break down as the subordination of time to space is
overturned. Daniela Voss summarises the implications of this ‘modern’ conception of
time as follows: ‘It has become an inﬁnite, straight line, which will cut right through
the consciousness of the subject. Its eﬀect… carries the subject to the border of the
liveable and destroys the well-constituted identity of the subject’ (2013, p. 215).
We have seen that according to Deleuze it was in the critical philosophy of Kant that
resources could be found to deduce a pure and empty form of time. But, Deleuze does
not follow Kant who he accuses of subsequently subordinating time to an external,
active synthetic unity; the transcendental subject. Unlike the Cartesian Cogito, the trans-
cendental subject is not a substantial being but a universal form, a form which is
imposed upon a ‘passive’ sense. This schism or discontinuity in Kant’s thought between
concepts and intuitions and the sensible and the intelligible, is established in order to
ensure that the unity of the subject-identity is maintained (synthetic identity). Because
of this the function of time is once again reduced to the maintenance of identity
suggesting to Deleuze that its form has not changed signiﬁcantly from before. Deleuze
rejects what he calls historical ‘Man-God permutations’ of analytic and synthetic identity:
‘The oneness and identity of the divine substance are in truth only the guarantees of a
unique and identical Self, and God is retained so long as the Self is preserved. Finite syn-
thetic self or divine analytic substance: it amounts to the same thing’ (1968/1994, p. 58).
Following post-Kantians such as Salmon Maimon (1753–1800), Deleuze seeks after con-
ditions not of possible experience but of ‘real’ experience. These are genetic conditions
no longer constrained by the necessary imposition of a transcendental subject. In the
second chapter, ‘Repetition for Itself,’ from Diﬀerence and Repetition, Deleuze refers to
these conditions as ‘passive syntheses’ of time.
My point is that ‘multiplicity’ and passive syntheses of time might be construed as
openings onto an enchanted repetition. The ‘empirical’ material of synchronistic experi-
ences indicate a rupture with a spatialised image of time as well as breaking with the
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discontinuity between an external, active power which infuses an otherwise, passive, life-
less material. With respect to the latter we are dealing with a discontinuity and it is this
which informs most of the post-Jungian anti-foundationalist critiques of Jung’s thought.
Concluding remarks: seeds of anti-foundationalism in Jung’s thought
Enchanted moments and encounters with an ‘other repetition’ gesture to openings on to
transversal relations which are no longer presupposed to be immanent to 'mini-transcen-
dences to humanity itself in early modern scepticism and humanism; to the cogito of Des-
cartes; to the transcendental subject of Kant; and to the phenomenological consciousness
in Husserl’ (Ramey, 2012, p. 20).
To this list perhaps we could add ‘psyche’ as a ‘primary datum’ (Colman, 2017, p. 35) and
even ‘Self’ as an external ‘One’ of monotheism’ (Hillman, 1981, pp. 109–137). Robin McCoy
Brooks asserts that ‘Jung’s foundationalism… perpetuates the myth of the isolated mind’
(2011, p. 292). Similarly Lasdon Hinton argues that Jung’s privileging of the Unus mundus
as a ‘foundationalism repeats a primal error of modern thought that can be very destruc-
tive in its unforeseen eﬀects’ (Hinton, 2011, 377). If these assertions have merit, then
Deleuze’s critique of external conditioning could be used alongside the more frequent
appeals to Martin Heidegger’s (1889–1976) phenomenology oﬀered by some post-Jun-
gians as the most adequate solution to the alienating logical and ethical implications of
Jung’s alleged ‘foundationalism’. Crudely speaking, the orientation of these post-Jungians
can be characterised as phenomenological, occasionally utilising philosophical critiques by
Levinas and Derrida as well as asserting the importance of Heidegger’s phenomenology
and its relevance for modern bio-phenomenology and neuroscience (additional allies
for Analytical Psychology that militate against the insuﬃciencies in Jung’s ‘foundationalism’).
Suspects from Jung’s corpus other than the Unus mundus which enter into the purview
of post-Jungian ‘anti-foundationalist’ re-visioning include synchronicity (e.g. Brooke,
2015, pp. 70–71; Colman, 2015, p. 319), the archetypes (Colman, 2016, p. 49–51), esse in
anima (Brooks, 2011, pp. 498–500; Colman, 2017, pp. 34–36) and the psychoid (Brooks,
2011, p. 500; Colman, 2015, p. 320). By marginalising these concepts it is assumed that
the ‘dualisms tacitly adopted in Jung’s foundationalist epistemology’ (Brooks, 2011,
p. 494) will be attenuated for analytic theory and practice. The ethical implications of foun-
dationalism in clinical practice ‘privilege the illusion of the analyst’s epistemological auth-
ority’ (Brooks, 2011, p. 495).11 Furthermore, foundationalism undermines ‘the task of
entering into the world of the other’ which ‘we aim to do as psychotherapists, with the
caveat that, because we are also wanting to inﬂuence the other’s world, we need to
invite them to enter our world’ (Colman, 2015, pp. 331–332). In Levinasian terms the
‘Face of the Other’, including our patients in all their complexity and creativity, may
be subsumed to an idea’ (Hinton, 2011, p. 376) necessitating the need to ‘manifest the
Levinasian spirit of ethical relation into the clinical realm… a surrender to the utter
enigma of the patient, recognising that I am always already held hostage to his or
her suﬀering (or any state)… I must… assume responsibility for the feeling of what is
happening between us’ (Brooks, 2013, p. 86).12
What these arguments have in common is a critical interrogation of the logical and
ethical implications of a certain discourse of relations. In each case what is questioned is
the presupposition of an external condition that is larger than what it conditions and
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which determines relations a priori. One might say that post-Jungian anti-foundational
critiques sift out and expose an ‘image of thought’ in the work of Jung that stands
in need of correction. The marginalisation of certain concepts (listed above) occurs
because each is assumed to reinforce a hierarchical separation between subject/
psyche and object, spirit and matter (inside and outside), analyst and analysand.
Although I ﬁnd many valuable resources in these post-Jungian critiques for demonstrat-
ing the continuing relevance of modern continental philosophical thought for Jungian
Studies, I am left wondering if their phenomenological analyses of foundationalism
go far enough toward oﬀering a genesis of conditions or if they succumb to the resur-
rection of a ‘mini-transcendence’ in another form to which relations are immanent. If we
take the recent turn to a bio-phenomenological paradigm of embodiment oﬀered by
Warren Colman as a potential solution to the alienating and disenchanting eﬀects of
Jung’s ‘Cartesianism’, his request that we treat all ‘life’ as ‘bounded in a nutshell’
(2015) seems to relocate the borders of an active synthetic ‘unity’ to the boundaries
of the organism. Arguably this has a liberating eﬀect on relations, attenuating any
stark separation between ‘mind’ and ‘body’, but my concern would be that it reinforces
relations of interiority, conceiving of ‘life’ as autopoietic and in terms of organisationally
closed wholes.13 I worry that a new foundation, whole, or external condition is being res-
urrected in order to correct the ‘error’ of Descartes. Following Claire Colebrook I would
categorise this line of thought as modern example of ‘active vitalism’:
We can discern this vitalism in three contemporary motifs: an insistent, tireless and bitter anti-
Cartesianism that accuses Descartes of separating thought from embodied life; a joyous
‘return’ to living systems, autopoietic bodies, embodied brains, aﬀect and the feeling of
what happens; and a redemptive departure from the supposedly overly linguistic strictures
of ‘theory’ to a phenomenology of the lived.’ (2010, p. 48)
If ‘we’ have a ‘natural’ and embodied mode of relating, then why did the thought of Des-
cartes and whole populations succumb to ‘error’ and conceal this mode of relating with all
its disenchanting consequences? A fuller genesis of the ‘error’ would be required.
From a Deleuzian perspective it can be contended that the concepts which are mar-
ginalised in the post-Jungian critiques I referred to above, can be reimagined as ‘open-
ings’ to enchanted ‘Others’: repetition as an enchanted ‘other’-repetition in the example
I presented from synchronicity in this paper; esse in anima as an ‘opening’ to an
enchanted sensation; the ‘psychoid’ as an ‘opening’ to an enchanted vitalist-materialism
and psychoid-archetypes as openings to enchanted spatio-temporal dynamisms. Each
of these examples can be supported with evidence from Jung’s own work and from
the work of scholars within Jungian studies (Addison, 2009, 2015; Bishop, 2008, 2017),
Deleuze Studies (Kerslake, 2004, 2007) and elsewhere (Barentsen, 2015). These are
Jung’s own concepts, concepts he creates, and this suggests to me that he was
engaged with the problem of the boundaries of the psyche all his life, but particularly
during his later years, and that he sought to provide his readers with a way to think
about the dynamic ﬂuidity of these boundaries. These concepts are ‘images’ of
thought in Jung’s work, they are put to work, helping us to move, and think beyond
what we experience, challenging us to avoid subordinating psychic life, a life of ‘vitality’
to the very foundational premises that some accuse their operational purpose of rein-
forcing. It is with regret that I have not been able to consider these examples in any
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detail in this paper. Nonetheless I have attempted to prepare the groundwork for them
all, using the example from synchronicity in the manner of a primer.
Notes
1. Lambert cautions that the term ‘vitality’ has led to many mistaken assumptions that Deleuze
was addressing a traditional notion of philosophical vitalism (Lebensphilosophie), but Deleuze
was referring to something else when he speaks about ‘vitality’ in relation to the ‘uncovering
of a world of pre-individual, impersonal singularities’ in place of a world occupied by Individ-
uals and Persons’ (2012, p. 7).
2. In a 1988 interview Deleuze remarked: ‘Everything I’ve written is vitalistic, at least I hope it is’
(1995, p. 143).
3. The inﬂuence of Bergson’s notion of intuition on Jung’s use of this term has been examined in
the literature. See Gunter, 1982, pp. 635–652; Shamdasani, 2003, pp. 207–210; Kerslake, 2007,
pp. 49–100; Pilard, 2015, pp.155–168; Addison, 2016, p. 567–587.
4. An essay which complemented the themes of organicism that this paper seeks to address
might situate Jung’s complicated relationship with Joyce’s Ulysses (1919) in relation to the
same theme from an aesthetic perspective. It might also consider in detail possible resonances
between Jung’s description of himself as an ‘empiricist’ and Deleuze’s philosophical approach
which he characterised as ‘transcendental empiricism’.
5. It may appear perplexing that a ‘recent’ continental philosopher like Deleuze, often labelled as
a ‘post-structuralist’ and ‘post-modernist’ thinker, would take an interest in these themes at all.
6. In various ways the following Deleuzian scholars have demonstrated that Deleuze can be
regarded as a thinker of enchantment; Bennett, Kerslake (2007), Colebrook (2010), Brent
Adkins and Paul Hinlicky (2013) and Joshua Ramey (2012).
7. This term makes its most frequent appearance in the eleventh ‘plateau’, ‘1837: Of the Refrain’
of A Thousand Plateaus (1980/1987, pp. 310 – 350).
8. It might be worth recalling that Bateson (1904–1980) was inﬂuenced by Jung, particularly his
deployment of Pleroma and Creatura from Septum Sermones as Mortuos (Seven Sermons for
the Dead) which Jung wrote between 1913 and 1916. For Bateson it is the interface (inter-
action) between pleroma and creatura that is signiﬁcant as this enables a system to utilise
diﬀerence.
9. Most of these ‘becomings’ are detailed in the tenth plateau of A Thousand Plateaus: ‘1730:
Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible’ (1987, pp. 232–309).
10. Deleuze and Guattari borrow this phrase from a play by Antonin Artaud (1896–1948), ‘To Have
done with the Judgement of God,’ (1947). They discuss this in the sixth ‘plateau’ of A Thousand
Plateaus ‘How do you Make yourself a Body without Organs’ (1980/1987, p. 150).
11. I am not entirely convinced by this given Jung’s keen awareness that ‘[p]ersonal and theoreti-
cal prejudices are the most serious obstacles in the way of psychological judgement’ (1934,
para. 237, cf. pars. 318, 319, 342)
12. Deleuze’s ‘immanent ethics’, largely inspired by Spinoza and Nietzsche, is incompatible with
Levinas’s stress on the absolute transcendence of the Other. Daniel Smith writes that the
‘ethical themes one ﬁnds in transcendent philosophies like those of Levinas and Derrida –
an absolute responsibility for the Other that I can never assume, or an inﬁnite call to justice
that I can never satisfy – are, from the Deleuzian point of view of immanence, imperatives
whose eﬀect is to separate me from my capacity to act. From the viewpoint of immanence,
in other words, transcendence, far from being our salvation, represents our slavery and impo-
tence reduced to its lowest point… for Deleuze transcendence is the fundamental problem
of ethics, what prevents ethics from taking place, so to speak’ (2012, p. 177).
13. Deleuzian critiques of the conception of the ‘organism’ in the school of ‘autopoiesis’ devel-
oped by the Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela are presented in
the work of Colebrook (2010, pp. 29–30, 49–50, 141–144, 155–157) and Alberto Toscano,
(2006 pp. 55–60).
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